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Abstract
Obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS) are the main safeguard against objects that can pose a hazard to aircraft operations at and around
airports. The standard dimensions of the most of those surfaces were estimated using the pilot’s experience at the time when they were
included in the standard documents. As a result, some of these standards may have been overestimated, while others may not provide an
adequate level of safety. With airports moving to the Safety Management System (SMS) approach to design and operations safety, proper
evaluation of the level of safety provided by OLS at specific sites becomes important to airport operators. Therefore, this study attempts to
collect actual flight path data using information provided by air traffic control radars and to construct a methodology to assess the
probability of aircraft deviating from their approach path. This will be helpful to estimate safe and efficient standard dimensions of the
OLS and assess the risk level of objects to the aircraft operations around airports. The methodology is presented using the aircraft
trajectories of approaches at Ottawa International Airport (CYOW). Estimated dimensions of Code 3 approach surfaces also are presented.
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Aerodrome design standards are the main framework
used for planning and design of airport facilities. They were
established over 60 years ago in order to maintain safe
aircraft movements at and around aerodromes. Obstacle
limitation surfaces (OLS) are part of aerodrome standards.
They are a set of imaginary surfaces defined at and around
airports to protect airborne aircraft operations from
obstacles that can pose a hazard to their movements.
Most often, those safety surfaces extend well beyond the
airport property and, as a result, certain areas around
airports are considered as integral parts of the aerodrome
environment (ICAO, 1983). Furthermore, OLS are identi-
fied as an important design standard affecting the
orientation of the runway system layout.
Internationally agreed standards for airport design were
established as Annex 14 to the Chicago Convention on
Civil Aviation (ICAO, 1999). However, each country uses
its own standards for planning criteria related to aero-
dromes. Although most of those national standards are
based on Annex 14, some countries may elect to develop
and adopt their own standards. AC 150/5300-13 in the
USA (FAA, 2004), TP 312 in Canada (Transport_Canada,
1993), and CAP 168 in the United Kingdom (CAA, 2011)
are examples of national standards used in different
countries. In all those standards, shapes and dimensions
of the OLS and their objectives are defined. A careful
review of those standards reveals that there are some
differences in dimensions and shapes of OLS among those
documents. For instance, in contrast to the trapezium shape
longitudinal cross section of obstacle free zone (OFZ)
prescribed by the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), a rectangular section is defined in Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) standards (FAA, 2004).
Generally, aviation safety organizations allow deviations
from these standards when designing the airfields, if the
designer can prove that an adequate of level of safety is
achieved.
According to ICAO (1983), the significance of any
existing or proposed objects to the safety of aircraft
operations within the aerodrome boundary or vicinity of the
aerodrome is assessed by the use of two separate sets of
criteria defining airspace requirements. Obstacle limitation
surfaces are the main standard defined in Annex 14 to
minimize the collision risk of airborne aircraft near airports.
The second set of criteria comprises obstacle assessment
surfaces (OAS), also known as PANS-OPS surfaces
(ICAO, 2006; Litesheim & Xiao, 2006). The main purpose
of PANS-OPS surfaces or OAS is to provide guidance for
procedure designers to estimate the obstacle clearance
height (OCH) in an airport and assess the risk of obstacles
near the runways. OCH is the height at which aircraft can
initiate a missed approach in a low visibility condition
when it uses the instrument approach procedures. Pilots are
only allowed to descend below this level if they have clear
sight that the aircraft is correctly aligned with the runway
and there are sufficient visual cues to continue the
approach.
The height of the objects that penetrate the OAS
surfaces, the characteristics of aircraft, and navigation
facilities at a runway are used to calculate its OCH using
the OAS. The OAS consists of six sloping plane surfaces
whose shape and dimensions are determined by linear
equations. The coefficients and constants of those equa-
tions are available in the PANS-OPS OAS software
provided by ICAO.
In coming years, it is expected that air transportation will
experience greater growth than what has been observed
during the last decade. With this expected traffic growth,
airports will need to expand their facilities to increase
aircraft operation capacity (Hall et al., 2008). In such
situations, it may be impractical or impossible to meet the
requirements of existing OLS standards due to space
limitations at and around airports. As a result, airports may
have to use new dimensions for the OLS and check the
level of safety of the modified surfaces.
A thorough review of the literature has identified very
few studies done to justify the level of safety of existing or
modified OLS standards, plus a few studies that were
carried out to measure the level of safety of OFZs using
simulated flight paths (Eddowes, Hancox, & MacInnes,
2001; ICAO, 2005b). Recently, studies done by Fricke and
Thiel (2013) assessed the level of safety provided by OLS
and PANS-OPS using the radar data. The methodology
presented in their studies did not consider the dependency
between the lateral and vertical deviation data that
significantly affects the analysis results. Other studies have
focused on the flight path deviation analysis (Thiel &
Fricke, 2010; Thiel, Seiß, Vogel, & Fricke, 2012). Marco
and Auria (2014) analyzed the flight trajectories generated
with 6 degrees of freedom (6DoF) flight simulations and
developed a methodology to calculate the collision risk
with objects near airports. The analysis was based on the
simulated flight paths generated by Monte Carlo simula-
tion. Cramer and Rodriguez (2013) studied the path
steering error (PSE) effect on the calculated lateral aircraft
deviation. PSE is defined as distance from estimated
aircraft position to a beam point on the lateral computed
path. In that study, the effect of the total system error on the
calculated aircraft deviation was studied. There also are
computer programmes such as SAT-P, PDToolKit
(MITRE, 2015) available commercially to identify the
hazardous obstacles with respect to the existing standards.
In the 1960s, a joint effort by the FAA’s flight standards
organization and ICAO’s obstacle clearance panel (OCP)
developed the collision risk model (CRM) for instrument
landing system (ILS) operations. The main objective of this
model was to determine the area that needed to be protected
when an aircraft is making an ILS approach. This model is
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still being used to assess the risk of obstacles below the
decision height (DH) in ILS operation by aviation
authorities. The main shortcoming of the model is that it
can only be used to analyze the ILS approaches. Therefore,
it only considers the instrumental errors of the ILS system.
However, deviation due to aircraft characteristics, pilot
techniques, and weather condition are ignored in the model
(ICAO, 1980).
It was found that in most recent studies related to airport
standards, the dimensions of a safety standard can vary
with respect to the geographical location of an airport and
local weather condition (Eddowes et al., 2001). Therefore,
it is more cost effective if an airport can estimate the
required dimensions of OLS according to their local
weather and geographical conditions. The expected move
in the United States and Canada to a Safety Management
Systems (SMS) approach to airport regulation (ICAO,
2012) confirms this perception. To address this rising issue,
this study proposes a methodology to estimate the
probability of aircraft deviation from standard flight paths
using actual flight trajectories. Moreover, an extension of
the methodology can be used to estimate the dimensions of
the OLS that provide the acceptable level of safety for air-
craft operations. The analysis is presented using the aircraft
trajectories at Ottawa International Airport (CYOW). As an
example, approach surface dimensions for ICAO Code 3
instrument and non-instrument were estimated and com-
pared with the existing OLS and PANS-OPS surface
dimensions.
According to ICAO (1999), the objective of the approach
surface is to protect the aircraft when approaching a
runway. Its dimensions depend on the aircraft code number
and the approach category. The aircraft code number
mainly represents the kinetic energy of an aircraft on final
approach, using the aircraft’s reference field length as a
proxy. The approach category represents the type of
approach (i.e., visual or instrument, precision or non-
precision) according to weather conditions and available
navigation instruments. The standard dimensions and
geometric shape of the approach surface are shown in
Table 1 and Figure 1.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies
publicly available that explain the rationale for the ICAO
standards presented in Table 1. By analyzing actual aircraft
trajectories, one can estimate the probability density func-
tions of deviations from the standard flight path. These
probability density functions can then be used to determine
the risk of a collision between an aircraft and objects—
existing or hypothetical—located in the proximity of the
aircraft’s path. Such analysis can then be used both to
determine the level of safety at existing airports and to set
risk-based standards for the design of new facilities. This
paper discusses a methodology to collect data on aircraft
trajectories and evaluate these deviation probability dis-
tribution functions using data collected at CYOW.
Acceptable Risk or Target Safety Level (TLS)
for Aircraft Operations
The main reason for developing a safety standard is to
provide an acceptable level of safety to aircraft operations.
An acceptable level of safety is defined with respect to the
risk for aircraft operations. According to the Civil Aviation
Authority of Sri Lanka, safety risk is defined as ‘‘the
assessment, expressed in terms of predicted probability and
severity of the consequence(s) of a hazard taking as
reference to the worst foreseeable situation’’ (CAASL,
2010). The worst foreseeable situation can vary with
respect to the phase of the aircraft operation. For example,
aircraft can collide with an object when taxiing or
Table 1.








1 2 3 4 1,2 3 4
Cat I Cat II, III
1,2 3,4 3,4
Length of inner edge (m) 60 80 150 150 150 300 300 150 300 300
Distance from threshold (m) 30 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Divergence (each side) 10% 10% 10% 10% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15%
First section
Length (m) 1600 2500 3000 3000 2500 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000
Slope (m) 50 40 3.330 2.50 3.330 20 20 2.50 20 20
Second section
Length (m) NA NA NA NA NA 3600 3600 12000 3600 3600
Slope (m) NA NA NA NA NA 2.5% 2.5% 3% 2.5% 2.5%
Horizontal section
Length (m) NA NA NA NA NA 8400 8400 8400 8400 8400
Total length (m) NA NA NA NA NA 15000 15000 15000 15000 15000
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approaching a runway. The severity and frequency of these
two situations are not equivalent.
According to ICAO, the accepted probability of this kind
of incident to occur during an aircraft operation is defined
as the acceptable safety level (ASL). This kind of approach
to safety management recognizes that it is unrealistic to
expect a zero risk. Some risk may have to be tolerated to
secure the benefits of an activity. Risks must therefore be
balanced with the benefits, with regard to the practicability
of achieving further risk reduction (Eddowes et al., 2001).
Assigning an ASL value to a safety standard that protects a
specific phase of an aircraft operation is a complicated
process since it depends on the likelihood and severity of
an incident that could occur during that phase of operation.
For example, the acceptable probability of a low speed
aircraft wingtip collision with an object during a taxiing
operation can be higher than for a catastrophic event such
as an aircraft hitting an obstacle when on final approach.
According to ICAO (2012), the consequence or severity
of an incident is classified into four categories:
Catastrophic, Hazard, Major, and Minor. The likelihood
of occurrence is categorized into Extremely Improbable,
Extremely Remote, Remote, Reasonably Probable, and
Frequent. The combination of those categories creates a
Risk Tolerability Matrix such as the one shown in Table 2.
As can be seen in Table 2, only acceptable and review
incidents are allowed to occur at airports and ASL values
for those incidents should be established after a cost-benefit
analysis.
In this study, the event of an aircraft hitting an object on
the ground when approaching or departing from a runway
will be considered an extremely improbable, catastrophic
event. The main objective of the OLS is to reduce the
frequency of such an event as far as reasonably practicable.
According to the risk tolerability matrix, the acceptable
frequency of such an incident can be estimated by cost-
benefit analysis. According to ICAO’s obstacle clearance
panel, a 10-7 probability is used for risk of collision per
movement with an obstacle due to the aircraft being
laterally off-path or beneath the approach path (Eddowes
et al., 2001). The TLS value that should be used in
aeronautical studies is set by ICAO (1980; 2005b).
However, this value can change from country to country
or even region to region because the results of the cost-
benefit analysis depend on the investment made on safety
in those countries. The estimation of the acceptable safety
level for obstacle limitation surfaces is beyond the scope of
this study. Therefore, we have assumed a 10-7 collision risk
per approach as the acceptable safety value to estimate the
dimensions of OLS recommended by ICAO and its
obstacle clearance panel (Eddowes et al., 2001). This value
was used in most recent aeronautical studies as a TLS value
(Hall et al., 2008; Wong, Pitfield, Caves, & Appleyard,
2009a). However, the proposed methodology can be used
to estimate the dimensions for any given value of ASL.
Deviations from Annex 14 standards can be accepted
after an aeronautical study. The primary objective of an
aeronautical study is to assess the adequacy of protection
provided by the existing layout for the operation of the
critical aircraft (ICAO, 2005a). Therefore, it depends on
several factors such as weather, geographical character-
istics, aircraft operational characteristics, and the flight
Table 2.
Risk tolerability matrix. Source: ICAO, 2012.
Probability of Occurrence
Severity Extremely Improbable Extremely Remote Remote Reasonably Probable Frequent
Catastrophic Review Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable
Hazardous Review Review Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable
Major Acceptable Review Review Review Review







Figure 1. Obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS). Source: ICAO annex 14 (2005b).
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phase. Decision makers must consider those factors when
they are conducting an aeronautical study in order to make
modifications to the existing standards. In most of the
previous studies (Wong et al., 2009a:Valdés, Marı́a,
Comendador, Gordún, & Nieto, 2011; Wong, Pitfield,
Caves, & Appleyard, 2009b), quantitative risk assessment
method was used to carry out the aeronautical studies based
on acceptable or target level of safety.
Quantitative risk assessment criteria were used to mea-
sure the level of safety of design standards by Eddowes and
colleagues (2001) in Norwegian airports. That study
identifies the need for changes in Annex 14 standards to
maintain an adequate level of safety in Norwegian airports.
The study also indicates that aerodrome standards can vary
with respect to the geographical location of an airport. In
2010, a study was conducted by ICAO and the FAA to
assess the risk level of existing OFZ standards when
operating the new large aircraft (NLA) (ICAO, 2005b).
OFZ is a type of OLS that provides protection for balked
landings and missed approaches. The objective of that
study was to verify the possibility of operating Code F
aircraft in existing aerodromes that currently operate as
Code E. The study used simulation flight path data to
analyze the risk level of the OFZ. As a conclusion, it was
shown that Code E autopilot OFZ surfaces are acceptable
for autopilot operations of NLA. Furthermore, it was found
that NLA that operate using a flight director (FD) can
operate at Code E Category I runways. From these
findings, it can be argued that the current standards for
OLS were not estimated properly. Therefore, further studies
will be helpful to estimate the optimal balance between
safety and cost-effectiveness for OLS standards.
Methodology
The assessment of risk associated with aircraft deviation
from the standard path during airborne operations is some-
what more complex than the case with ground operations,
because of the three-dimensional nature of flight paths. The
analysis needs to be carried out by considering all three
directions that affect the deviation probability (i.e., lateral,
vertical, and longitudinal). To achieve this, the proposed
methodology was divided into two major components: data
processing and analysis. These two components are described
in detail in following sections.
Flight Trajectory Data Collection and Treatment
Flight trajectory data were collected using NAVTRACK
software. NAVTRACK is a web-based application devel-
oped by Nav Canada—the air traffic service provider in
Canada—capable of collecting and saving the flight path
Figure 2. Observed error of flight paths.
Flight path cross point 
Runway cross point (C)
X direction 
Y direction
Figure 3. Runway cross point and flight path cross point.
A. Silva & A. G. de Barros / Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering 55
data that is tracked by air traffic control (ATC) secondary
radars in real time. However, the positional accuracy and
more information on the secondary radar system were not
made available to the authors. In this study, NAVTRACK
was used to collect data from August 2011 to August 2012.
NAVTRACK collects the aircraft location data recorded
every five seconds, within a 20 km radius from an airport.
This information can be used to display the airplane
movements on Google Earth in real time. With this data, it
is possible to plot the aircraft trajectories both on take-off
and final approach.
At five-second intervals, aircraft geographical position
(i.e., latitude, longitude, and altitude), speed, type, ID, and
origin and destination airports are tracked and saved in
KMZ format (Google Earth file). These files can be directly
downloaded from the server and used to view the historical
flight paths in Google Earth. This option helps the user to
identify the runway that was used for an aircraft operation.
The KMZ files can only be used to work with Google
Earth applications. Therefore, KMZ files were converted to
KML files in order to extract required information.
MATLAB is a popular tool capable of reading the data in
KML files. A MATLAB program was developed in order
to filter the relevant information such as coordinates and
aircraft attributes from the KML files. Furthermore, a
separate program was developed to convert the geographi-
cal coordinate system data to the Universal Transverse
Mercator (UTM) coordinate system. This conversion will
help to plot the aircraft trajectories in a three-dimensional
Cartesian coordinate system. The conversion equations can
be found in Synder (1987).
Truncation Error
In the data filtering process, it was observed that flight
paths are shifted to a southeast direction from the runway
when it was plotted on Google Earth (Figure 2). According
to Nav Canada, this deviation is due to the reduced number
of decimal points of tracked coordinates of aircraft.
Therefore, it is a constant error in the tracked coordinates
and needs to be corrected before the analysis of aircraft
deviation. The following methodology was used to remove
that truncation error from the data. It is mainly based on
the assumption that on average, aircraft should be on the
runway center line when they are moving on the runway.
In other words, if an airport has crossing runways, then the
aircraft movements on runways should intersect at the cross
point of the two runways. Therefore, this methodology can
be used only at airports that have crossing runways in order
to remove that truncation error from the data.
Initially, the data samples of flight paths were collected and
plotted on an XY coordinate system, and coordinates of cross
section points of flight paths were calculated using Cartesian
geometry (Figure 5). According to the assumption, calculated
cross points should be at the intersection of the two runways if
there is no truncation error in the data. Therefore, the deviated
distance of X and Y directions were calculated with respect to
the point C (Figure 3). Then, the average deviation was
calculated for both X and Y directions. This process was
performed on the large and small aircraft samples (i.e., Code
1, 2, 3, and 4) in order to represent the all aircraft types, and
average values of deviation were calculated. According to the
results, it was found that X and Y directions have 64 m and
-36m average errors, respectively. Therefore, 64 m was
subtracted from every coordinate in the X direction and 36 m
was added in the Y direction to remove the truncation error
from the data. After this correction, all the aircraft paths were
on the runway and their deviation can be calculated with
reference to the runway center line direction.
Coordinate System
To measure the deviation of a flight from its intended path,
the coordinate system was defined with reference to the
runway threshold. The origin was established at one of the
runway thresholds of a given runway and the line connecting
the two runway thresholds taken as the Y axis. The X axis and
Z axis were defined as parallel to the runway surface and
perpendicular to the XY plane respectively. Figure 4 shows the
diagram of the coordinate system that was used in this study.
Intended Flight Path
When aircraft is on the final approach to an airport, it
needs to follow a predefined path, which in this study is
referred to as the intended flight path. In instrument landing
system (ILS) approaches, the intended flight path is defined
by the intersection between the localizer and the glide slope
planes (Figure 4). In non-precision and visual approaches,
aircraft should follow the extended runway center line
direction, and the descent rate which is stated in approach
procedures. Therefore, in non-precision approaches and
visual approaches, it is difficult to find the vertical angle of
the approach path because it can change with respect to
point at which it starts the final approach. Therefore, it was
decided to measure the vertical deviation of aircraft with
respect to the runway threshold elevation and lateral
deviation with respect to the runway center line.
Categorization of Aircraft Approaches
Deviation of an aircraft from its intended path could
be a result of one or multiple factors. For example, it can be
due to lack of pilot experience, bad weather conditions
such as high cross winds and poor visibility, calibration
errors of the navigation instruments that are used for
instrument approaches in airports and aircraft, and so
forth. As a result, it is impossible to identify the exact
reason for the deviation of an aircraft when the only data
available is the actual trajectories for the analysis.
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According to ICAO (1999), the effect of some of those
factors on OLS dimensions is represented by categorizing
the runways with respect to the approach type and code
number (Table 1).
In this analysis, approach trajectory data of ICAO Code
3 aircraft on CYOW runway 07-25 were analyzed.
According to the Canada air pilot (CAP) 4 document
(Nav Canada, 2012), runway 07-25 has been used for both
non-precision and precision approach procedures (Table 3)
(Nav Canada, 2012). In precision approaches (PA), the
pilot get both vertical and lateral guidance, but in non-
precision approaches (NPA), they only get lateral guidance.
Therefore, if we are going to estimate OLS dimensions
with respect to the type of approach (i.e., precision, non-
precision, visual), deviation data needs to be divided
according to that. In order to do that categorization, a
database that contains aircraft approach information for
CYOW is required. However, during our study, we were
unable to acquire such database for CYOW.
Therefore, it was decided to combine the non-precision
and precision approach data and analyze the aircraft
approaches with respect to the meteorological condition
(i.e., instrument and visual) at the airport. Due to that
categorization, the study is unable to show the effect of
guidance system to deviations from the intended path. How-
ever, OLS is a permanent surface for a runway. Therefore, if
a runway has been used for both types of approaches, then
that runway’s OLS should provide protection for both types
of approaches. As a result, it can be argued that the
dimensions of OLS that we get from this analysis by
combining the NPA and PA will provide the adequate level
of safety for both types of instrument approaches.
To distinguish the approaches under visual meteorolo-
gical conditions (VMC) and instrument meteorological
conditions (IMC), METAR data containing weather
information for CYOW was obtained from the Ontario
Centre for Climate Impacts and Adaptation Resources.
According to Horonjeff and colleagues (2010), aircraft
should use instrument procedures in IMC. However, in
VMC, aircraft are allowed to use instrument approach
procedures. Therefore, when we categorize the data
according to the meteorological condition, instrument
approach data may be included in the VMC data.
Calculation of the Deviations From Intended Path
Aircraft deviation from its protected path was calculated
at 500 m intervals along the runway center line (Figure 4).
In this calculation, it is assumed that magnitude of
deviation does not change significantly within a given
500 m interval along the intended flight path. In this study,
Cartesian geometry calculations were used to estimate the
deviation distances along the extended runway center line
direction. As a first step, the Cartesian equation of the











The equations for the cross section lines that are per-
pendicular to the runway center line and at 500-m intervals are
y~m2xzC2 ðEq:2Þ
Figure 4. Runway coordinate system and intended path.








cos h ; h~tan
{1(m2)
Then, the equation between two tracking points of









In this step, we assumed that the flight path between two
tracking points can be represented using a straight line.
Finally, the intersection point of cross section line and






















(xi, yi, zi) 5 Tracking point coordinates of the aircraft
(i 5 1,2)
(Xi, Yi) 5 Runway threshold coordinates (i 5 1,2)
(Xc, Yc) 5 Runway center line and cross section line
intersecting point coordinate (c 51-16).
D 5 deviation distance
mi 5 gradient of line; Ci 5 intercept of line
These were used to measure the distance between the
aircraft’s center of gravity and the runway center line
extension. The diagram of a flight path and the deviations is
shown in Figure 5. Both horizontal and vertical deviations
from the intended path were measured at each cross section
plane. Afterward, aircraft characteristics and weather
condition were assigned to those points to filter the data
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Estimation of Distribution Function Parameters
The deviation probabilities for approaches in a cross section
can be calculated by fitting the deviation data to univariate or
bivariate continuous probability density functions (PDF). As
described above, maximum deviation data were used for the
analysis. The type and parameters of the deviation distribu-
tions need to be estimated for each 500 m cross section
separately. Moreover, it is important to check the dependency
of the lateral and vertical deviation data before estimating the
distribution functions. If the data are dependent, it is necessary
to estimate the joint probability functions, whereas if they are
independent, two separate distribution functions can be used
for the vertical and lateral deviations.
According to the above methodology, independent data
were fitted to the normal mixture distribution and
Figure 5. Notations for flight path deviation calculations.
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dependent data were fitted to joint normal distribution
(Equations 12 and 13). The main objective of using the
normal mixture distribution is obtaining a good fit not only
for the tail of the distribution, but also for the central part of
the distribution. However, it can be argued that the results
which are produced using the normal distribution is not
precise when estimating the extreme probability values
such as 10-7. Therefore, in the future research, results needs
to be compared with results obtained from using the
extreme value distribution.
f xð Þ~W1  f x,m1,s1ð ÞzW2  f x,m2,s2ð Þ
zW3  f x,m3,s3ð Þ ðEq:12Þ
where





























mi 5 mean of the variable
si 5 variance of the variable
r5 correlation parameter
xi, yi 5 aircraft deviation (lateral or vertical)
The parameters of the distributions were estimated
separately for deviation data at every 500 m cross section
using the "nor1mix" package, which was built under
R project. The package has functions to estimate parameters
of the bivariate and univariate distribution parameters of nor-
mal distribution using the expectation maximization (EM)
algorithm. The EM algorithm is an iterative method for
finding maximum likelihood estimates of parameters
in statistical models, where the model depends on un-
observed latent variables (Maechler, 2013). Furthermore the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test was used to measure the
goodness of fit (GOF) of the distribution models. The K-S
test does not produce good estimates for large sample sizes
due to its poor assessment of fit at the tail (Eiger, Nadler, &
Spiegelman, 2013). However, it is important to note here
that not only do the extreme probabilities affect the
calculation of location probabilities, but also the middle
Figure 6. Iso probability curves around the intended path.
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part of the distribution. Therefore, measuring the fit in
the central part of the distribution curves is also essential. For
this reason, the normal mixture distribution was used to
estimate the overall goodness of fit for the entire data range,
and the K-S test was used to assess the fit. However, in
future studies, it is recommended that an extreme value
distribution be used to more accurately estimate the density
function’s tail.
Estimation of the Required Dimensions of the
Approach Surface
As described in Section 1, the main objective of the OLS
is to protect airborne aircraft from obstacles on the ground
in the vicinity of an airport and reduce the likelihood of
collisions with such obstacles. Therefore, the dimensions of
the OLS depend on the probability of an aircraft deviating
from the approach path. The OLS is defined by the surface
beyond which the probability of collision with an obstacle
on the ground is below the acceptable safety level.
The estimated distribution functions can be used to find
the inverse of the cumulative probabilities or quantile values
of the probabilities that aircraft deviate beyond a given
distance. In this study, those probability values are defined
as the location probabilities of an aircraft. Equations 14 and
15 can be used to estimate the quantile values of the location
probabilities in a given cross section. The quantile values can
be estimated for 10-1 to 10-7 location probability values for
each cross section. In the next step, points that have the
acceptable level of safety (i.e., 10-7) were identified and
connected to develop iso-probability curves. This was done
for each cross section, and iso-probability points were














P 5 acceptable level of safety or given location
probability value
F(x,z) 5 cumulative probability function
Results
In this study, two samples of 943 and 882 IMC and
VMC Code 3 aircraft trajectories were analyzed, respec-
tively. The categorized approach data were used to measure
the aircraft deviation from its intended path and esti-
mate deviation distribution functions. Before fitting this
deviation data to distribution functions, a Pearson correla-
tion test was carried out to check the independency of
lateral and vertical deviation data in every cross section.
The null hypothesis of the test is that the correlation
coefficient is equal to zero, and the alternative hypothesis is
that the correlation coefficient is not equal to zero.
Therefore, if the p value of the test is greater than 0.05,
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
The results of the Pearson correlation test are shown in
Table 4a-b for code 3 aircraft, which are operated under
VMC and IMC. According to the analysis, no significant
correlation between lateral and vertical deviation data was
found. All the p values of the tests were greater than 0.05.
We cannot reject the null hypothesis at 95 confidence level.
Therefore, two separate distribution functions were used for
vertical and lateral deviations to calculate the deviation
probability on a cross section.
Table 4a.
Pearson correlation test on data for Code 3 aircraft under IMC.


















Pearson correlation test on data for Code 3 under VMC.
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Table 5a.
Lateral deviation distribution parameters for Code 3 aircraft under IMC.
Section K-S dist P-value m1 m2 m3 s1 s2 s3 W1 W2 W3
500 0.0129 0.9820 -4 -0.50 -0.22 269 1.5 63 0.34 0.15 0.50
100 0.0116 0.9949 -29 -2 27 329 214 467 0.31 0.29 0.38
1500 0.0101 0.9994 -26 2 31 353 286 452 0.33 0.28 0.37
2000 0.0161 0.8939 -19 6 32 434 342 538 0.35 0.29 0.35
2500 0.0146 0.9458 -19 9 41 495 302 518 0.36 0.32 0.30
3000 0.0096 0.9997 -21 8 38 527 293 573 0.34 0.29 0.35
3500 0.0089 0.9999 -20 20 43 507 355 868 0.35 0.30 0.34
4000 0.0097 0.9997 -14 15 48 725 606 708 0.34 0.28 0.36
4500 0.0172 0.8422 -17 19 51 673 519 643 0.35 0.31 0.33
5000 0.0110 0.9977 -18 18 49 840 487 892 0.35 0.26 0.37
5500 0.0116 0.9949 -19 22 65 795 523 6256 0.39 0.32 0.27
6000 0.0113 0.9964 -23 22 63 891 515 878 0.34 0.31 0.33
6500 0.0102 0.9992 -28 23 633 948 480 1256 0.38 0.24 0.37
7000 0.0141 0.9605 -23 15 61 1446 905 1395 0.35 0.26 0.37
7500 0.0094 0.9998 -31 22 68 1170 770 1468 0.34 0.28 0.36
8000 0.0122 0.9908 -34 27 69 1315 1150 1888 0.34 0.30 0.35
Table 5b.
Vertical deviation distribution parameters Code 3 aircraft under IMC.
Section K-S dist P-value m1 m2 m3 s1 s2 s3 W1 W2 W3
500 0.0109 0.9980 152 152 172 81 26 113 0.27 0.32 0.40
100 0.0129 0.9825 183 184 208 157 46 53 0.29 0.53 0.16
1500 0.0170 0.8529 204 213 235 161 50 87 0.21 0.62 0.15
2000 0.0180 0.8003 222 243 265 75 49 80 0.20 0.69 0.10
2500 0.0158 0.9060 252 274 274 74 36 246 0.27 0.42 0.30
3000 0.0096 0.9997 279 304 301 54 44 267 0.30 0.43 0.25
3500 0.0160 0.8949 307 333 329 49 45 215 0.36 0.34 0.29
4000 0.0146 0.9468 338 351 364 54 350 49 0.45 0.18 0.36
4500 0.0147 0.9433 361 367 389 136 33 117 0.21 0.28 0.50
5000 0.0119 0.9928 391 397 421 192 37 100 0.27 0.33 0.39
5500 0.0176 0.8187 400 425 445 52 66 151 0.08 0.45 0.45
6000 0.0107 0.9984 433 458 483 55 77 66 0.15 0.62 0.22
6500 0.0135 0.9731 463 486 498 76 51 142 0.23 0.36 0.39
7000 0.0120 0.9923 493 512 533 99 88 132 0.33 0.30 0.35
7500 0.0131 0.9803 528 548 556 232 47 197 0.46 0.25 0.28
8000 0.0200 0.6818 556 578 588 197 43 127 0.55 0.17 0.27
Table 5c.
Lateral deviation distribution parameters Code 3 aircraft under VMC.
Section K-S dist P-value m1 m2 m3 s1 s2 s3 W1 W2 W3
500 0.0086 0.9071 -0.25 -0.35 -3.0 44 1.8 298 0.44 0.12 0.42
100 0.0088 0.8948 -26 1.0 32 351 303 380 0.36 0.28 0.34
1500 0.0080 0.9464 -21 11 34 371 418 575 0.35 0.28 0.35
2000 0.0072 0.9795 -21 12 38 352 271 521 0.35 0.29 0.34
2500 0.0068 0.9872 -17 14 40 445 379 619 0.34 0.29 0.35
3000 0.0053 0.9996 -18 13 44 464 331 593 0.34 0.28 0.36
3500 0.0079 0.9504 -16 16 49 483 336 592 0.34 0.28 0.37
4000 0.0056 0.9992 -15 23 51 647 448 808 0.35 0.29 0.34
4500 0.0078 0.9543 -16 19 57 684 406 716 0.35 0.28 0.36
5000 0.0067 0.9902 -21 19 55 721 442 866 0.34 0.27 0.37
5500 0.0087 0.9024 -23 21 61 808 516 877 0.34 0.30 0.34
6000 0.0067 0.9906 -23 23 65 905 578 1037 0.34 0.30 0.35
6500 0.0075 0.9693 -27 21 65 880 623 1168 0.32 0.30 0.37
7000 0.0074 0.9709 -28 23 69 1072 873 1474 0.33 0.30 0.35
7500 0.0078 0.9527 -32 28 65 1032 1113 1801 0.33 0.29 0.37
8000 0.0086 0.9082 -34 23 64 1390 1187 2241 0.30 0.26 0.42
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Table 5d.
Vertical deviation distribution parameters Code aircraft under VMC.
Section K-S dist P-value m1 m2 m3 s1 s2 s3 W1 W2 W3
500 0.0110 0.6690 152 153 170 158 32 149 0.24 0.3 0.38
100 0.0109 0.6890 180 183 194 193 34 186 0.28 0.37 0.34
1500 0.0125 0.5158 192 213 223 74 39 220 0.14 0.57 0.27
2000 0.0124 0.5212 221 243 248 71 39 268 0.24 0.49 0.26
2500 0.0121 0.5554 248 272 276 50 51 313 0.30 0.48 0.20
3000 0.0127 0.4951 277 302 298 49 54 436 0.36 0.42 0.20
3500 0.0095 0.8339 307 322 332 58 493 56 0.43 0.25 0.31
4000 0.0238 0.0153 314 335 355 76 35 261 0.06 0.32 0.60
4500 0.0180 0.1243 344 365 383 59 42 294 0.10 0.31 0.57
5000 0.0185 0.1042 372 395 411 53 38 376 0.12 0.32 0.55
5500 0.0154 0.2632 400 425 437 50 48 441 0.13 0.30 0.56
6000 0.0116 0.6112 432 456 465 64 40 502 0.20 0.25 0.53
6500 0.0090 0.8759 461 487 493 63 67 689 0.28 0.31 0.40
7000 0.0133 0.4352 488 502 521 26 355 763 0.14 0.42 0.42
7500 0.0167 0.1827 513 543 564 210 421 1758 0.27 0.65 0.06
8000 0.0165 0.1939 547 582 588 218 346 2281 0.51 0.41 0.07
Figure 7a. 3-D view of the 10-7 estimated OLS surface for Code 3 IMC aircraft approaches with existing ICAO OLS surface. Figure 7b. Plan view of the 10-7
estimated OLS surface for Code 3 IMC aircraft approaches with existing ICAO OLS surface. Figure 7c. Profile view view of the 10-7 estimated OLS surface
for Code 3 IMC aircraft approaches with existing ICAO OLS surface.
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The estimated parameters of the mixture of normal
distribution and K-S goodness of fit results are shown in
Table 5a-d for each meteorological condition. The esti-
mated goodness of the fit test’s p values indicates that all
the models have a significant goodness of fit.
Iso-probability surfaces for IMC approaches for a 10-7
location probability are shown with the existing ILS and
PANS-OPS surfaces in Figures 7 and 8, respectively.
In this study, we assumed that IMC approaches represent
instrument approaches. Therefore, the estimated surface
was also compared with the PANS-OPS surface, which is
specifically designed to protect instrument approaches. To
estimate the dimensions of the PANS-OPS surface, it was
assumed that the glide path angle is 3 ,̊ the distance
between the localizer and the runway threshold is 3,000 m,
and the missed approach gradient is 2.5%. The dimensions
of the assumed surface were obtained from the examples
presented in the PANS-OPS standards document. Figure 9
compares the estimated surface for VMC approaches with
the non-instrument surface. The plain color surfaces show
the existing dimensions of the OLS/PANS-OPS, and the
surfaces illustrated with multiple colors represent this
study’s estimated surface dimensions. The different colors
of the estimated surfaces were used to show changes in the
vertical dimensions and to provide a visual comparison.
The estimated lateral and vertical maximum values of the
surface for each cross section along the approach path are
shown in Table 6a-b.
The results of the analysis show that the estimated lateral
dimensions of the approach surfaces were smaller than both
the Annex 14 standards and PANS-OPS standards.
However, the required lateral dimensions were compara-
tively higher for the IMC approaches than for the VMC
approaches. Moreover, the estimated surfaces indicate that
Figure 8a. 3-D view of the 10-7 estimated OLS surface for Code 3 IMC aircraft approaches with existing ICAO PANS-OPS surface. Figure 8b. Plan view of
the 10-7 estimated OLS surface for Code 3 IMC aircraft approaches with existing ICAO OLS surface. Figure 8c. Profile view of the 10-7 estimated OLS
surface for Code 3 IMC aircraft approaches with existing ICAO OLS surface.
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vertical dimensions of some of the approach surfaces
require greater clearance than the existing surfaces in IMC
operations.
It can be concluded that there has been improvement in
airport navigational facilities compared with the past,
which has affected the magnitude of aircraft deviation
from its intended path. However, these results cannot be
used to assess the effect of navigational facilities between
instrument and non-instrument approaches due to the
absence of approach type information. Therefore, to
conduct a more detailed analysis, it is important to know
the type of approach for each flight trajectory.
Furthermore the developed surface’s dimensions are
presented without considering the effect of aircraft
geometry to its dimensions. Therefore, the wingspan length
and aircraft height must be taken into account when
calculating the critical OLS dimensions for an airport. As a
result, aircraft types that are operated at an airport also
significantly affect the OLS dimensions.
Conclusion
This paper summarizes the methodology that was used to
calculate the probability of aircraft deviations from their
intended path. Deviation probability functions were devel-
oped using the collected aircraft approach trajectories at
CYOW. The data were extracted from the NAVTRACK
software developed by Nav Canada. This study proposes a
novel approach to assess the risk of OLS using actual flight
path data. Most of the previous studies related to the
obstacle restriction standards were developed using simu-
lated flight paths. Those studies are not capable to represent
all the factors in aircraft deviation. It is obvious that we
cannot also identify all of those influence factors. However,
those factors are embedded in the actual deviations
measured. The same methodology can be used to develop
the probability models for missed approaches and take off
operations to estimate the dimensions of the take off and
transitional surfaces.
Figure 9a. 3D view of the 10-7 iso-probability curve for Code 3 aircraft approaches under VMC. Figure 9b. Plan view of the 10-7 iso-probability curve for
Code 3 aircraft approaches under VMC. Figure 9c. Profile view of the 10-7 iso-probability curve for Code 3 aircraft approaches under VMC.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































66 A. Silva & A. G. de Barros / Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering
The results of this study indicate that there is a con-
siderable difference between dimensions of the existing
ICAO ILS and PANS-OPS approach surface, and estimated
surfaces that were obtained using the observed flight paths.
This shows that the dimensions of existing surfaces may be
overestimated as they provide higher levels of safety for
aircraft operations than prescribed by ICAO. This is a
desirable result at airport sites where the OLS impose no
significant restrictions either to aircraft operations or to the
land use in the airport’s vicinity. However, if there is a
restriction to aircraft operations at an airport due to obstacles
that penetrate the OLS or PANS-OPS surface prescribed by
the standards, this methodology can be used to check the
level of safety of those operations or the risk of collisions
with said obstacles. Furthermore, the goodness of fit test
results indicate that models can produce statistically sig-
nificant results, which is a good encouragement for future
works stemming from this study. The proposed methodol-
ogy will be a great help for airport expansion projects
because airport owners will able to manage their available
space efficiently by assessing the level of safety of aircraft
operations. Using the proposed methodology, the risk of
collision with objects around the airports can be calculated.
This will also be helpful for real estate developers to identify
the limitations of their constructions, such as the height of
the buildings. Moreover, this methodology can be used in
the future to develop a computer model to estimate the risk
level imposed by obstacles around the airports for both
visual and instrument aircraft approaches.
The results of the study are based on the data collected
from CYOW runway 07-25. For other runways and
other airports, separate analyses need to be performed for
different approach types to the same runway to estimate the
critical surface that should be used as the OLS. Moreover,
other runways in CYOW and other airports need to be
modeled to observe the effect of approach types and
geographical condition on aircraft deviation from intended
paths. The effect of positional error of radar tracking points
in the analysis results is also acknowledged. Positional
errors of tracked coordinates can impact the calculations of
aircraft deviation from its intended path. According to
Equations 7 and 8, the magnitude of error in deviation
values (i.e., D and z) is decided by the positional accuracy
of the xi, yi, and zi coordinates. Therefore, it can be argued
that the parameters of the deviation distributions also are
dependent upon the positional accuracy of the tracked
coordinates. Nevertheless, if it were possible to collect
more accurate aircraft trajectories, then the effect of
positional error to the analysis would be insignificant. As
a result, a methodology to model the positional error would
not be required.
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